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Introduction 
 The technological revolution of the 21st century has transformed many facets of life for 
humans. For the many millions around the world who have access to Internet connectivity, 
personal communication has now become nearly instantaneous, and information on any topic is 
easily available. The benefits of digital advancement are as numerous as the technologies are 
popular. In developed nations, information and communication technologies have become 
embedded in the fabric of modern life, becoming a tool for socioeconomic development.1 
 Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are a classification of technologies 
that commonly include Internet usage, cellular phones, and other wireless networks. Just as ICTs 
aid development of other kinds, they have also become instruments capable of influencing 
political development. Neither are these impacts limited to the developing world. ICT usage, for 
example, is much higher in the United States than in developing nations; indeed, it would be 
difficult to understand political life in the United States comprehensively without accounting for 
ICT usage. 
 Bolivia provides an opportunity to examine the effect of ICTs on political development 
due to its possible socioeconomic impact. The country is polarized both ethnically and 
geographically, exhibiting a high degree of underdevelopment among certain segments of the 
population. Much of the citizenry remains poor, especially those in rural and/or mountainous 
regions. Due to the expensive cost of operating ICTs, Bolivia lacks widespread ICT use (only 37 
percent owned computers in 2014).2 It is this variation which makes Bolivia a prime candidate to 
study the effect of ICTs on political development.  
                                               
1 Björn-Sören Gigler, Development as Freedom in a Digital Age: Experiences from the Rural Poor in Bolivia 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2015), 4-5, http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-1-4648-0420-
5. 
2 “The Americas Barometer,” Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2017, www.LapopSurveys.org.  
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 The Bolivian political scene features the charismatic populist, Evo Morales, who has 
served as president since 2006. Morales has secured the long-term support of indigenous 
Bolivians by rallying them in a contentious political battle against the socioeconomic elite he 
claims has profited from the subjugation of the marginalized native peoples. Bolivians are highly 
divided in their opinion of Morales. 
 This piece will examine the effect ICT use has on political development, defined here as 
the process of enhancing political knowledge and behavior.3 Using survey data from 
Vanderbilt’s Latin American Public Opinion Project, this research will use probit and ordered 
probit regressions to assess ICTs’ impact on political development, including participation 
(voting) in elections, trust in institutions, and overall perception/orientation in the political world.  
Literature Review 
 Examining the role of ICTs on the perceptions of legitimate government in Bolivia, Bjorn 
Soren Gigler’s piece, “Development as Freedom in a Digital Age: Experiences from the 
Rural Poor in Bolivia,” used the same independent variables and country of study as the 
following research. Gigler claimed that, in a digital age, “informational capability” was required 
for rural Bolivians to enhance their lives through information and communication technologies.4 
Rather than viewing individuals as mere beneficiaries of community development processes that 
incorporate ICTs, Gigler believed that community development is people-centric, and that 
civically engaged individuals are active participants regardless of their political situation.5 The 
effect of ICTs on these people’s lives was then applied to this framework of development.  
                                               
3 Ali Pirannejad, “The Effect of ICT on Political Development: A Qualitative Study of Iran,” Information 
Development 27.3 (2011): 187. 
4 Gigler, Development as Freedom in a Digital Age, 4. 
5 Ibid. 
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Gigler pursued the following multi-level research question: (1) Are ICTs effective in 
fostering development (if so, when), and (2) what role do organizations that aid the poor play in 
adapting ICTs to meet local needs? Using survey data from 365 predominantly indigenous 
persons, Gigler examined the effect of ICTs on development. While he noted the risk of 
continued inequality due to ICT nonuse, Gigler rejected the idea of a digital divide, instead 
positing a “capability divide” between populations and emphasizing the importance of general 
user technology competence.6 He also rejected the assumption that ICT access creates 
development per se, examining how these ICTs are used by analyzing their role in populations 
rather than their mere presence. Through empirical analysis, Gigler found that ICT programs 
must: (1) be based on local need, (2) strengthen, or build on existing technological habits, and 
(3), be embedded in traditional social structures. Factors relevant to the impact of ICTs on the 
Bolivian population included high illiteracy and poverty rates. Those lacking technological 
capabilities were mostly indigenous, a reflection of their social and economic exclusion in 
Bolivia. Interestingly, these poor, rural Bolivians had very high expectations of how ICTs could 
change and improve their lives. This was especially true for indigenous women.7 
While Gigler’s research was empirical in nature, Ali Pirannejad’s study analyzed the 
qualitative effects of ICT on the political development of both the government and the people. 
Focusing on personal political development, survey respondents articulated that ICTs enhanced 
political development in two ways. The first was public control—the ever-improving ability of 
citizens to monitor and scrutinize the government.8 ICTs make this monitoring possible by 
facilitating access to relevant information on the operations (and success or failure) of the 
various levels of government. Pirannejad claimed that ICTs not only improved perceived 
                                               
6 Ibid,, 391-392. 
7 Ibid,, 118. 
8 Pirannejad, “The Effect of ICT on Political Development,” 191-192. 
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governmental accountability through awareness, but that citizens with access to ICTs made 
monitoring the government a priority. He contended that ICTs are, thus, a form of public 
control.9 Those societies with high levels of public control exhibit strong trust and high levels of 
political participation. This assertion will be put to the test in this essay. 
 The second political development process that Pirannejad found was positively impacted 
by ICTs was political empowerment.10 Political empowerment refers to the access ICTs give 
citizens the ability to gather and then communicate political information easily. Informational 
access provides an opportunity to learn and improve political awareness, and this “education” 
informs the user of political structures, civic debates, and complex political situations. Through 
this learning process, ICT users improve their understanding of relevant political issues and 
trends in political decision making.11 
 Providing a relevant empirical framework to this piece’s research question and design is 
Luisa Blanco and Isabel Ruiz’s piece. Examining the effect of Latin America’s high crime rate 
on local governmental processes, Blanco and Ruiz noted that trust in a democratic institution 
largely determines the institution’s effectiveness.12 Using repeated cross sections from 
Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in Columbia during 
the period 2004-2010, Blanco and Ruiz assessed the effect that crime has on democratic trust 
through an ordered logit regression function.13 
 This regression’s dependent variable, trust in government institutions and democracy, is 
measured in various ways. To test trust in democracy, respondents were asked to indicate both 
                                               
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 192. 
11 Ibid., 192-193. 
12 Luisa Blanco and Isabel Ruiz, “The Impact of Crime and Insecurity on Trust in Democracy and 
Institutions,” American Economic Review 103.3 (2013): 284-288. 
13 Ibid. 
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their support for and satisfaction with democracy on scales of one-to-seven and one-to-four, 
respectively.14 Similarly, to test trust in government institutions, respondents were asked to rate 
their trust in institutions such as the criminal justice system, national government, and armed 
forces. For the independent variables, Blanco & Ruiz selected three dummy variables (victim of 
a crime, loss in armed conflict, government employees requesting a bribe), and a one-to-four 
scale index (degree of security/insecurity). The model included the following control variables: 
setting (urban), sex, race, age, children, marital status, years of education, and income level.15 In 
controlling for both time and entity fixed effects, Blanco and Ruiz found largely negative 
correlations of crime on the level of trust in democracy and institutions. The findings in this 
study are less relevant than the methodology used, which will help model this piece. 
Data & Methodology 
Pirannejad’s research took place in a country similar to Bolivia—Iran. Iran and Bolivia 
both have great diversity in locales and socioeconomic development among their populaces. This 
piece will use similar metrics of political development but in an empirical framework. First, this 
research will examine the assertion that those countries with good public control (associated with 
ICT use) will possess more trust in the government. This is put to the test by analyzing the trust 
populations place in both specific and general institutions of the state. Second, this study will test 
whether ICTs enhance populations’ political awareness and knowledge, creating individuals with 
more political competence. Political empowerment will be studied by a variety of metrics 
including knowledge, confidence, and orientation. 
 This research piece will exclusively use data from Vanderbilt University’s LAPOP 
Americas Barometer survey. Conducted in two-year intervals throughout 34 Latin American 
                                               
14 Ibid., 285. 
15 Ibid. 
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countries (Bolivia in even-numbered years), this survey collects information from citizens 
concerning basic characteristics of their lives, attitudes on various aspects of society, and 
experiences living in Latin America. In Bolivia, these surveys were administered in three 
languages: Spanish, Aymara, and Quechua (the latter two are indigenous languages). The 2014 
surveys were conducted between March 26th and May 18th. 
 The following ordered probit equation will be used to estimate the effect of ICTs on 
political development using the cross-sectional LAPOP data: 
1. Yi* = a + β1computeri + β2interneti + β3cell_phonei + β4internet_usagei + 
β5news_attentioni + β6landlinei + β7televisioni + 1Xi + St + eit 
Yi*, a latent continuous variable on an assumed normal distribution, will be estimated through the 
following format, using Yi as the observed ordinal variable: 
Yi = j Û  κj-1 < Yi* ≤ κj 
Yi* lies between -  and + . 1Xi serves as a vector of control variables that affect the dependent 
variable, St is used to denote time dummy variables, and eit denotes the error term.  
Our independent variable, ICT usage, is measured through five dummy variables and two 
discrete variables. The dummy variables, recorded as a “1” if applicable, are: owning a cellular 
phone, owning a landline phone, having a computer in house, and possessing home Internet 
connectivity. The first discrete variable gauges the degree to which the respondent uses the 
Internet on a scale of one-to-five. The second discrete variable is the degree to which 
respondents pay attention to news coverage, recorded on the same five-level scale. Additionally, 
an ICT principle component will be calculated and used in the regressions. Principle component 
analysis is a data reduction method using eigenvectors. This ICT principle component will 
contain most of the ICT variance, and will bring additional insights on the effect of ICTs. 
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Using an empirical framework similar to that of Blanco and Ruiz, the dependent variable 
of political development will be measured in a variety of ways. The dependent variable of 
democratic confidence is measured in support for democracy (on a scale of one-to-seven, with 
one being the least and seven the most). Confidence in President Evo Morales is measured by 
examining the responses on a one-to-seven scale. In gauging participation, survey respondents 
rated whether they voted in the last presidential election (a dummy variable). Confidence in 
understanding political issues is also measured on a seven-point scale. 
Control variables include education, income, marital status, number of children, race, 
language, and indigenous/non-indigenous. The following regression methodology will be used 
for each dependent variable: 
§ Baseline (without ICTs) 
§ All ICTs Together 
§ Principal Component in Lieu of ICTs 
§ ICTs Individually 
 
These regressions use maximum-likelihood estimation to calculate coefficients and significance 
levels for our independent variables. Marginal Effects will then be calculated for our independent 
variables of interest (ICTs) for purposes of interpretation. 
Hypotheses 
 This research will posit the following hypotheses to be tested using the probit and ordered 
probit models. The first dependent variable to consider is voting (probit model). Because 
Pirannejad’s piece finds that ICT users exhibit higher political participation, the hypothesis to 
test will be that ICT usage positively or negatively affects voting. The null hypothesis states that 
no significant relationship exists. 
1H0: ICT usage does not affect voting 
1H1: ICT usage has a nonzero effect on voting 
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This piece will next test confidence in political issues. Again building on Pirannejad’s findings, 
confidence is expected to rise with ICT usage. Therefore, this study will test if ICT usage 
positively or negatively affects political confidence. The null hypothesis expects no change. 
2H0: ICT usage does not affect confidence 
2H1: ICT usage has a nonzero effect on political confidence 
 
The third variable tested is satisfaction with President Evo Morales. No sources in the literature 
review comment on political orientation in relation to ICT usage, but here the hypothesis that 
ICT usage has a “nonzero effect” on satisfaction with the president is tested. 
3H0: ICT usage does not affect Morales satisfaction 
3H1: ICT usage has a nonzero effect on Morales satisfaction 
 
Lastly, this study will examine the effect of ICT usage on democracy favorability. As with the 
previous hypothesis, the null here will assume no relationship, while the alternate hypothesis will 
assume an effect, either positive or negative. 
4H0: ICT usage does not affect favorability of democracy 
4H1: ICT usage has a nonzero effect on favorability of democracy 
 
Results 
 This section summarizes the results of econometric models found in the appendix. 
Overall, significant results were found when examining ICTs’ effect on political confidence and 
views of President Evo Morales. 
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Figure 1. ICT Usage by Type, 2014 
Summary statistics can be found in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. Table 1 shows 
summary statistics on the independent variables used in the study—both ICT variables and 
control variables. Some variables are not offered for all six years of study, indicated with a 
smaller value in the observations column (news attention and home Internet). Most independent 
variables are dummy variables. Table 2 provides the same statistics for the dependent variables. 
Figure 1, above, shows relative ICT usage by type. Television remains more popular that other 
ICTs, and home internet remains at low levels. Figure 2, below, indicates that cellular telephone 
usage is increasing among Bolivians while landline phone usage is steadily declining. 
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Figure 2. Phone Ownership by Type, 2006-2014 
 Turning to the regression results, this study began with a probit regression with voting 
participation as the lone dependent variable. Table 3 shows the results of the baseline probit 
model with all ICT variables together, and a third model using the most explanatory component 
of the ICT variables. The baseline model showed that being female has a significant negative 
effect on voting participation. In the second model, only Internet usage (an ordered choice 
variable) and news attention (also an ordered choice variable) were found to have a significant 
relationship with participation. Furthermore, the principal component did not have a significant 
effect on voting behavior. Table 4 displays the results from the fourth model, which tested each 
ICT variable individually, finding no significance with most ICT variables. Landline phones and 
televisions are the exception in this case, showing significant negative effects on voting 
behavior. In general, these results indicate ICTs have a negligible effect on voting participation. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Landline Cellular
 11 
Despite a few exceptions, no significant change occurred when accounting for ICTs, so the null 
hypothesis (1H0) cannot be rejected in this case. 
 
 The above table displays the marginal effect of ICTs on the probability of a specific 
outcome, voting in the presidential election in this case. The most significant ICT variable, 
attention to news coverage, increases the probability by .02. Television ownership decreases the 
probability of voting by .03. 
The next dependent variable studied was political confidence, or whether Bolivians 
understand major political issues. Table 5 details the initial three models. In the baseline model, 
it is apparent that age and education had significant positive effects on confidence in Bolivian 
politics. Introducing the ICTs in model 2, several variables were found to have significance when 
tested together. Internet usage, attention to news coverage, and cellular phone possession were 
found to have positive effects on political confidence, the latter two variables at the 1 percent 
level. Interestingly, television had a negative effect on confidence. The ICT principal component 
showed a significant positive effect on political confidence. The results of testing the ICT 
variables individually are displayed in Table 6. Six of the seven ICT variables exhibited a 
significant positive relationship with political confidence, television being the exception. The 
joint hypothesis test is significant at the 1%, so the null hypothesis must be rejected here. 
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Instead, the alternative hypothesis that a relationship exists, positive in this case, predicts these 
results much more accurately. 
 
 This table displays the marginal effects of ICTs on the probability of a specific outcome 
of political confidence. Again, attention to news coverage is significant. A unit increase in news 
attention will increase the probability of being in one of the top three confidence categories by 
.0275. Cellular phone ownership is also associated with higher probabilities. 
 In Tables 7 and 8, the dependent variable is satisfaction with Evo Morales. Bolivians 
were much more likely to support Morales if they were indigenous, and much less likely to 
support Morales if they were female or well-educated. The second model showed that most ICT 
variables had no significant effect on voters’ approval of Morales. However, having a landline or 
in-home Internet showed a negative effect significant at the 1 percent level. Additionally, the 
principal component had a negative effect at the 1 percent level. In testing the ICT variables 
individually, landlines and home Internet again showed significant negative effects at the 1 
percent levels. Internet usage, cellular phone ownership, and computer ownership had negative 
effects on Morales satisfaction at the 1 percent level. Due to the fact that most ICT variables 
were found to negatively affect opinion on Morales, a relationship appears to exist. The joint 
hypothesis test is also significant at the 1% level, meaning the null hypothesis (3H0) must be 
rejected. 
 13 
 
 Marginal effects regarding the satisfaction of President Morales are listed above. 
Notably, home internet decreased in the probability of a positive rating (top three categories) by 
.067 Landlines also led to a greater probability of a poor rating. 
 The last dependent variable tested using these models is favorability of democracy. The 
baseline model in Table 9 shows, among other things, that increased education was positively 
related to satisfaction with democracy, while low-income individuals were more likely to 
disapprove of democratic governance. Only television users displayed any significant effect on 
democratic favorability among ICT variables (the relationship was negative, significant at the 1 
percent level). Despite this, the ICT principal component still exhibited a significant negative 
effect on democratic favorability. Table 10 shows more mixed results. Only the computer and 
television dummy variables show significant relationships with the favorability of democracy, 
both negative. Otherwise, the ICT variables had no significant effect when tested individually. 
Of the four dependent variables, democracy exhibits the weakest associational relationships.  
While only a few significant negative relationships can be found in this study, the joint 
hypothesis test registers a p-value of 0.000, meaning the null hypothesis (4H0) must be rejected. 
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 The above table displays the marginal effects of ICTs on the probability of a specific 
outcome (respondent chooses 1-7) regarding favorability of democracy. In the bottom five 
favorability categories, marginal effect probabilities of ICT dummies are overwhelmingly 
positive. Furthermore, increased news attention has a weak association with low favorability of 
democracy scores. 
 In sum, the probit and ordered probit models in this piece exhibit a mix of significant and 
non-significant results. Probit regression found no significance of ICTs when testing against 
voting participation. However, a significant positive result in relation to voter confidence was 
found using ordered probit regression (Tables 5 and 6). ICTs also exhibited negative significance 
when considering the popularity of President Evo Morales. Lastly, isolated significance in 
relation to opinions about democracy warranted a failure to reject the corresponding null 
hypothesis. 
Discussion 
 Despite Pirannejad’s findings that ICT usage increases participation, a non-significant 
result in relation to voter participation is not particularly surprising. While voting was included 
in Pirannejad’s analysis of political participation, it was not the sole participation indicator (e.g. 
attending meetings or engaging online). Voting among Bolivians, even among indigenous and 
rural people, is popular. Therefore, observing an effect from ICT usage is unlikely. This trend 
was reflected in the research. 
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  ICTs were found to have a significant positive effect on the second dependent variable, 
confidence in political issues. Pirannejad’s qualitative study finds an increase in confidence 
among ICT users, and this quantitative study matches that finding. Gigler also predicted higher 
expectations of government services due to ICT use, a result of the population’s confidence in 
institutions and understanding of relevant political issues. Of all the results corroborated in this 
study, these are the most definitive. ICT usage increases availability and usage of political 
information, allowing Bolivians to become more confident in their political understandings. 
Additionally, the vast majority of individual ICT factors showed a significant positive effect. 
 Next, ICT usage proved to negatively impact views of President Evo Morales. Within the 
heavily polarized country of Bolivia, it is difficult to extrapolate exactly what this result means. 
Greater ICT usage was associated with lower favorability of Morales. But the same can be said 
about the better-educated and women of Bolivia. Due to the limited number of control variables, 
it is not ultimately clear if ICT usage is the main factor in approval of the president or whether 
other demographics matter more. It must be noted that the principal component was found to be 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
 In testing the favorability of democracy, the results show somewhat surprising trends. 
Television appears to largely affect democratic approval, but none of the other ICTs display 
significance when tested together. While the principal component also shows a significant 
relationship, only television and home computers exhibit significant negative relationships when 
tested individually. This raises the question: What information specific to computers and 
television is causing this distrust in democracy? This question has no simple answer and due to 
the ambiguity of the results, no definitive conclusions can be reached here. 
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Limitations 
 The most pressing limitation is the small sample size. Only around 3,000 observations are 
recorded per year in this cross-sectional dataset, and not every ICT variable is measured in all six 
years. Additionally, this study only incorporates a limited number of demographic 
characteristics. Because of the relative small size of the dataset and list of controls, conclusions 
must remain tentative. The other main limitation found in this study is the fact that ICT usage in 
Bolivia is far from widespread. In 2014, only 37 percent of Bolivians owned a computer, 
although the percentage has been rising steadily. When this fact is compounded with widespread 
poverty in Bolivia, the possibility remains that ICT usage is largely dependent on income status. 
Thus, when testing the effect of ICT usage, these models are also testing income to a degree 
(even if income is controlled). With more data in the future, this limitation can hopefully be 
mitigated. 
Conclusion 
 As Bolivians increase their ICT usage, studying the accompanied relative political 
development becomes increasingly possible. Building off qualitative research in Iran by using an 
empirical framework from Blanco and Ruiz, this research tests the effects of ICT usage on 
political development (participation, confidence, and opinions about the President and 
democracy). Using probit and ordered probit regression models, the results indicate ICTs have a 
significant positive relationship on political confidence, and a significant negative relationship on 
satisfaction with President Evo Morales. As discussed, these results indicate moderate political 
development due to ICT usage, but the results are far from definitive. Further study on this topic 
should be conducted, hopefully incorporating a larger sample size. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 
 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Internet Usage 11,785 2.0658 1.4041 1 5 
News Attention 9,056 4.3598 0.9813 1 5 
Landline Phone 18,141 0.2778 0.4479 0 1 
Cellular Phone 15,093 0.6786 0.4670 0 1 
Computer 18,155 0.2893 0.4535 0 1 
Home Internet 6,914 0.1513 0.3584 0 1 
Television 18,181 0.8401 0.3666 0 1 
Female 18,196 0.5019 0.5000 0 1 
Age 18,177 37.4735 15.2323 16 94 
Education 18,170 10.0893 4.8421 0 18 
Remittances 18,196 0.0491 0.2161 0 1 
Married 15,033 0.4418 0.4966 0 1 
Number of Kids 18,055 2.4014 2.2919 0 20 
Indigenous 17,406 0.1728 0.3781 0 1 
Low Income 18,196 0.4749 0.4994 0 1 
Medium Income 18,196 0.2995 0.4581 0 1 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Voted 9,356 0.7351 0.4413 0 1 
Political Confidence 11,485 3.8379 1.4712 1 7 
President 17,924 4.3327 1.7738 1 7 
Democracy 17,274 5.0037 1.4456 1 7 
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Table 3. Voter Participation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Baseline ICTs ICT PCA 
    
internet_usage  0.0513*  
  (0.0276)  
news_attn  0.0732**  
  (0.0288)  
landline  -0.0481  
  (0.0682)  
cellphone  -0.00210  
  (0.0730)  
computer_dum  -0.0202  
  (0.0858)  
internet_home  0.0623  
  (0.0954)  
tv  -0.114  
  (0.108)  
female -0.132*** -0.0407 -0.0603 
 (0.0339) (0.0542) (0.0537) 
age 0.00192 0.00598** 0.00483* 
 (0.00151) (0.00269) (0.00257) 
educ -0.00480 -0.000793 0.000611 
 (0.00423) (0.00801) (0.00789) 
remesas -0.131** -0.164* -0.157* 
 (0.0589) (0.0934) (0.0929) 
married 0.0759** 0.0199 0.00716 
 (0.0385) (0.0629) (0.0620) 
kidsnum 0.00895 0.00511 0.00598 
 (0.0107) (0.0187) (0.0186) 
indian 0.396*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 
 (0.0517) (0.0862) (0.0860) 
lowinc 0.0528 0.0764 0.0700 
 (0.0481) (0.0787) (0.0784) 
medinc -0.0124 0.0952 0.0829 
 (0.0453) (0.0711) (0.0703) 
2012.year 0.0273 -0.382*** -0.401*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0855) (0.0747) 
2010.year 0.377***   
 (0.0422)   
ICT1_pca   0.0311 
   (0.0235) 
Constant 0.418*** 0.254 0.618*** 
 (0.0927) (0.211) (0.150) 
    
Observations 6,666 2,852 2,852 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Voter Participation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Int. Usage News Landline Cell Phone Computer Home Int. TV 
        
internet_usage -0.00325       
 (0.0154)       
female -0.141*** -0.126*** -0.131*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.0583 -0.131*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0420) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0532) (0.0340) 
age 0.00170 0.00441** 0.00252 0.00178 0.00208 0.00522** 0.00193 
 (0.00155) (0.00188) (0.00153) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00253) (0.00151) 
educ -0.00453 0.00185 -0.00169 -0.00387 -0.00266 0.00264 -0.00289 
 (0.00465) (0.00528) (0.00443) (0.00434) (0.00453) (0.00725) (0.00431) 
remesas -0.131** -0.181** -0.123** -0.119** -0.128** -0.160* -0.122** 
 (0.0600) (0.0772) (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.0590) (0.0912) (0.0591) 
married 0.0714* 0.0372 0.0824** 0.0715* 0.0769** 0.0185 0.0786** 
 (0.0392) (0.0479) (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0386) (0.0610) (0.0387) 
kidsnum 0.0120 0.00638 0.00617 0.0113 0.00854 -0.00565 0.00947 
 (0.0110) (0.0135) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0179) (0.0107) 
indian 0.389*** 0.333*** 0.383*** 0.400*** 0.391*** 0.281*** 0.386*** 
 (0.0525) (0.0644) (0.0519) (0.0519) (0.0517) (0.0846) (0.0518) 
lowinc 0.0577 0.0779 0.0461 0.0488 0.0447 0.0582 0.0496 
 (0.0493) (0.0585) (0.0486) (0.0484) (0.0487) (0.0768) (0.0483) 
medinc -0.0130 0.0608 -0.0112 -0.00774 -0.0148 0.0772 -0.00895 
 (0.0460) (0.0520) (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0696) (0.0453) 
2010.year 0.375***  0.364*** 0.379*** 0.372***  0.377*** 
 (0.0428)  (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0423)  (0.0422) 
2012.year 0.0346 -0.336*** 0.0103 0.0312 0.0250 -0.390*** 0.0264 
 (0.0429) (0.0437) (0.0425) (0.0431) (0.0422) (0.0683) (0.0422) 
news_attn  0.0377*      
  (0.0206)      
landline   -0.106***     
   (0.0407)     
cellphone    -0.0264    
    (0.0410)    
computer_dum     -0.0557   
     (0.0421)   
internet_home      0.100  
      (0.0876)  
tv       -0.117** 
       (0.0567) 
Constant cut1 -0.430*** -0.457*** -0.412*** -0.427*** -0.414*** -0.593*** -0.500*** 
 (0.0988) (0.140) (0.0932) (0.0947) (0.0930) (0.144) (0.102) 
        
Observations 6,506 4,462 6,636 6,647 6,647 2,905 6,660 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Confidence in Major Political Issues 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Baseline ICTs ICT PCA 
    
internet_usage  0.0352*  
  (0.0187)  
news_attn  0.0761***  
  (0.0205)  
landline  0.0149  
  (0.0443)  
cellphone  0.126***  
  (0.0472)  
computer_dum  0.0436  
  (0.0576)  
internet_home  0.0934  
  (0.0691)  
tv  -0.332***  
  (0.0724)  
female -0.243*** -0.188*** -0.205*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0360) (0.0358) 
age 0.00311*** 0.00275 0.00189 
 (0.00108) (0.00180) (0.00172) 
educ 0.0411*** 0.0265*** 0.0271*** 
 (0.00300) (0.00541) (0.00535) 
remesas -0.0407 0.0670 0.0622 
 (0.0445) (0.0683) (0.0675) 
married -0.0421 -0.0282 -0.0468 
 (0.0267) (0.0431) (0.0426) 
kidsnum 0.00587 0.0284** 0.0306** 
 (0.00743) (0.0126) (0.0125) 
indian 0.0865*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0566) (0.0562) 
lowinc -0.0581* -0.0460 -0.0447 
 (0.0339) (0.0535) (0.0532) 
medinc 0.00857 -0.0333 -0.0337 
 (0.0315) (0.0486) (0.0480) 
2012.year -0.320*** -0.229*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0600) (0.0526) 
2010.year -0.0813***   
 (0.0280)   
ICT1_pca   0.0524*** 
   (0.0158) 
Constant cut1 -1.282*** -1.104*** -1.372*** 
 (0.0662) (0.139) (0.105) 
Constant cut2 -0.675*** -0.474*** -0.744*** 
 (0.0646) (0.138) (0.102) 
Constant cut3 -0.0704 0.150 -0.121 
 (0.0644) (0.138) (0.101) 
Constant cut4 0.707*** 0.935*** 0.658*** 
 (0.0647) (0.138) (0.102) 
Constant cut5 1.449*** 1.687*** 1.402*** 
 (0.0655) (0.139) (0.103) 
Constant cut6 2.053*** 2.296*** 2.008*** 
 (0.0680) (0.143) (0.107) 
    
Observations 8,017 3,411 3,411 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Confidence in Major Political Issues 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Int. Usage News Landline Cell Phone Computer Home Int. TV 
        
internet_usage 0.0435***       
 (0.0111)       
female -0.237*** -0.200*** -0.246*** -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.207*** -0.243*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0287) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0354) (0.0234) 
age 0.00377*** 0.00277** 0.00257** 0.00342*** 0.00275** 0.00211 0.00307*** 
 (0.00111) (0.00131) (0.00110) (0.00108) (0.00109) (0.00171) (0.00108) 
educ 0.0354*** 0.0325*** 0.0388*** 0.0383*** 0.0368*** 0.0319*** 0.0402*** 
 (0.00326) (0.00372) (0.00312) (0.00307) (0.00319) (0.00489) (0.00307) 
remesas -0.0595 0.0216 -0.0439 -0.0506 -0.0425 0.0821 -0.0410 
 (0.0455) (0.0591) (0.0446) (0.0449) (0.0446) (0.0668) (0.0446) 
married -0.0414 -0.0573* -0.0457* -0.0483* -0.0468* -0.0275 -0.0460* 
 (0.0271) (0.0328) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0420) (0.0268) 
kidsnum 0.0103 0.0115 0.00843 0.00665 0.00737 0.0200 0.00650 
 (0.00764) (0.00919) (0.00754) (0.00747) (0.00751) (0.0122) (0.00744) 
indian 0.0928*** 0.121*** 0.0942*** 0.0927*** 0.0921*** 0.164*** 0.0906*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0425) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0559) (0.0335) 
lowinc -0.0456 -0.0658 -0.0503 -0.0524 -0.0452 -0.0569 -0.0588* 
 (0.0347) (0.0411) (0.0341) (0.0340) (0.0341) (0.0524) (0.0340) 
medinc 0.0103 -0.0494 0.0103 0.00289 0.0117 -0.0309 0.00661 
 (0.0321) (0.0356) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0475) (0.0315) 
2010.year -0.0803***  -0.0760*** -0.0955*** -0.0773***  -0.0829*** 
 (0.0284)  (0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0281)  (0.0281) 
2012.year -0.329*** -0.234*** -0.311*** -0.348*** -0.321*** -0.178*** -0.321*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0303) (0.0307) (0.0315) (0.0307) (0.0483) (0.0307) 
news_attn  0.0800***      
  (0.0147)      
landline   0.0778***     
   (0.0280)     
cellphone    0.113***    
    (0.0277)    
computer_dum     0.115***   
     (0.0295)   
internet_home      0.163**  
      (0.0645)  
tv       0.0471 
       (0.0394) 
Constant cut1 -1.223*** -0.954*** -1.291*** -1.236*** -1.300*** -1.296*** -1.252*** 
 (0.0701) (0.0968) (0.0665) (0.0672) (0.0665) (0.0986) (0.0708) 
Constant cut2 -0.612*** -0.340*** -0.685*** -0.628*** -0.694*** -0.665*** -0.646*** 
 (0.0686) (0.0961) (0.0649) (0.0656) (0.0648) (0.0958) (0.0694) 
Constant cut3 -0.00657 0.276*** -0.0801 -0.0223 -0.0881 -0.0434 -0.0402 
 (0.0684) (0.0961) (0.0647) (0.0654) (0.0646) (0.0955) (0.0692) 
Constant cut4 0.770*** 1.046*** 0.695*** 0.754*** 0.687*** 0.733*** 0.737*** 
 (0.0688) (0.0966) (0.0650) (0.0657) (0.0649) (0.0959) (0.0696) 
Constant cut5 1.515*** 1.804*** 1.438*** 1.498*** 1.431*** 1.476*** 1.480*** 
 (0.0696) (0.0976) (0.0658) (0.0666) (0.0657) (0.0968) (0.0703) 
Constant cut6 2.119*** 2.372*** 2.043*** 2.102*** 2.037*** 2.083*** 2.085*** 
 (0.0721) (0.101) (0.0683) (0.0690) (0.0683) (0.101) (0.0725) 
        
Observations 7,829 5,335 7,986 7,994 7,993 3,478 8,009 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Approval of Executive (President Evo Morales) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Baseline ICTs ICT PCA 
    
internet_usage  -0.0274  
  (0.0187)  
news_attn  0.000686  
  (0.0195)  
landline  -0.138***  
  (0.0432)  
cellphone  -0.00904  
  (0.0482)  
computer_dum  0.0197  
  (0.0553)  
internet_home  -0.180***  
  (0.0698)  
tv  0.0468  
  (0.0677)  
female -0.0533*** -0.0840** -0.0876** 
 (0.0177) (0.0356) (0.0353) 
age 0.000893 -0.000852 -0.00120 
 (0.000806) (0.00179) (0.00171) 
educ -0.0196*** -0.0218*** -0.0204*** 
 (0.00222) (0.00535) (0.00524) 
remesas -0.136*** -0.00176 -0.00113 
 (0.0445) (0.0618) (0.0616) 
married 0.0430** 0.0466 0.0535 
 (0.0200) (0.0422) (0.0415) 
kidsnum -0.00652 -0.00496 -0.00306 
 (0.00551) (0.0134) (0.0132) 
indian 0.313*** 0.570*** 0.572*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0580) (0.0577) 
lowinc 0.163*** 0.148*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0517) (0.0516) 
medinc 0.0410 0.0274 0.0453 
 (0.0278) (0.0478) (0.0474) 
2012.year -0.148*** -0.362*** -0.330*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0589) (0.0521) 
2006.year 0.294***   
 (0.0247)   
2008.year 0.0626**   
 (0.0291)   
2010.year 0.203***   
 (0.0272)   
ICT1_pca   -0.0639*** 
   (0.0158) 
Constant cut1 -1.291*** -1.612*** -1.501*** 
 (0.0522) (0.134) (0.101) 
Constant cut2 -0.934*** -1.215*** -1.106*** 
 (0.0515) (0.133) (0.0999) 
Constant cut3 -0.493*** -0.776*** -0.669*** 
 (0.0511) (0.133) (0.0993) 
Constant cut4 0.0608 -0.266** -0.160 
 (0.0511) (0.132) (0.0991) 
Constant cut5 0.657*** 0.304** 0.410*** 
 (0.0513) (0.132) (0.0992) 
Constant cut6 1.273*** 0.944*** 1.050*** 
 (0.0520) (0.133) (0.101) 
    
Observations 14,045 3,543 3,543 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Approval of Executive (President Evo Morales) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Int. Usage News Landline Cell Phone Computer Home Int. TV 
        
landline   -0.0779***     
   (0.0211)     
female -0.118*** -0.0980*** -0.0507*** -0.0814*** -0.0536*** -0.0843** -0.0542*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0281) (0.0178) (0.0200) (0.0178) (0.0349) (0.0177) 
age -0.00131 0.000234 0.00142* -0.000223 0.00100 -0.000564 0.000877 
 (0.00108) (0.00130) (0.000818) (0.000907) (0.000809) (0.00168) (0.000808) 
educ -0.0271*** -0.0332*** -0.0171*** -0.0240*** -0.0177*** -0.0264*** -0.0197*** 
 (0.00324) (0.00366) (0.00231) (0.00255) (0.00233) (0.00479) (0.00228) 
remesas -0.112*** -0.0370 -0.131*** -0.113*** -0.135*** 0.000850 -0.136*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0542) (0.0445) (0.0434) (0.0446) (0.0609) (0.0446) 
married 0.0484* 0.0213 0.0466** 0.0605*** 0.0458** 0.0434 0.0423** 
 (0.0266) (0.0323) (0.0201) (0.0225) (0.0201) (0.0407) (0.0200) 
kidsnum -0.0146* -0.00395 -0.00846 -0.00833 -0.00739 -0.00442 -0.00631 
 (0.00777) (0.00941) (0.00557) (0.00623) (0.00555) (0.0129) (0.00552) 
indian 0.488*** 0.491*** 0.304*** 0.392*** 0.311*** 0.581*** 0.313*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0428) (0.0248) (0.0280) (0.0248) (0.0567) (0.0249) 
lowinc 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.156*** 0.173*** 0.157*** 0.170*** 0.164*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0395) (0.0264) (0.0289) (0.0264) (0.0511) (0.0263) 
medinc -0.00867 0.0327 0.0458* 0.0280 0.0452 0.0297 0.0412 
 (0.0311) (0.0354) (0.0278) (0.0292) (0.0278) (0.0471) (0.0278) 
2006.year   0.295***  0.286***  0.293*** 
   (0.0247)  (0.0249)  (0.0249) 
2008.year   0.0600** -0.210*** 0.0522*  0.0598** 
   (0.0292) (0.0289) (0.0294)  (0.0294) 
2010.year 0.153***  0.193*** -0.0524* 0.189***  0.202*** 
 (0.0286)  (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0278)  (0.0276) 
2012.year -0.172*** -0.348*** -0.160*** -0.380*** -0.158*** -0.367*** -0.149*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0306) (0.0296) (0.0483) (0.0297) 
internet_usage -0.0626***       
 (0.0111)       
news_attn  0.00654      
  (0.0149)      
cellphone    -0.102***    
    (0.0231)    
computer_dum     -0.0592***   
     (0.0216)   
internet_home      -0.248***  
      (0.0651)  
tv       0.00997 
       (0.0249) 
Constant cut1 -1.589*** -1.622*** -1.277*** -1.664*** -1.296*** -1.590*** -1.285*** 
 (0.0701) (0.0967) (0.0523) (0.0587) (0.0522) (0.0960) (0.0530) 
Constant cut2 -1.227*** -1.239*** -0.921*** -1.309*** -0.939*** -1.191*** -0.928*** 
 (0.0693) (0.0958) (0.0516) (0.0579) (0.0515) (0.0946) (0.0524) 
Constant cut3 -0.778*** -0.777*** -0.480*** -0.872*** -0.498*** -0.754*** -0.487*** 
 (0.0689) (0.0953) (0.0512) (0.0573) (0.0511) (0.0938) (0.0520) 
Constant cut4 -0.307*** -0.271*** 0.0724 -0.355*** 0.0550 -0.244*** 0.0658 
 (0.0686) (0.0951) (0.0512) (0.0572) (0.0511) (0.0934) (0.0520) 
Constant cut5 0.218*** 0.287*** 0.670*** 0.223*** 0.653*** 0.319*** 0.663*** 
 (0.0687) (0.0953) (0.0515) (0.0572) (0.0514) (0.0935) (0.0522) 
Constant cut6 0.792*** 0.880*** 1.284*** 0.825*** 1.267*** 0.961*** 1.278*** 
 (0.0693) (0.0961) (0.0521) (0.0578) (0.0520) (0.0950) (0.0529) 
        
Observations 8,172 5,568 13,998 11,116 14,011 3,618 14,037 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Satisfaction Toward Democracy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Baseline ICTs ICT PCA 
    
internet_usage  0.0133  
  (0.0188)  
news_attn  0.0364*  
  (0.0201)  
landline  -0.0661  
  (0.0460)  
cellphone  0.000662  
  (0.0465)  
computer_dum  -0.0616  
  (0.0578)  
internet_home  -0.0716  
  (0.0726)  
tv  -0.317***  
  (0.0642)  
female -0.0388** -0.0507 -0.0675* 
 (0.0180) (0.0361) (0.0359) 
age 0.00341*** 0.00208 0.00127 
 (0.000782) (0.00174) (0.00165) 
educ 0.0123*** 0.0114** 0.0127** 
 (0.00223) (0.00530) (0.00521) 
remesas -0.0123 -0.133** -0.134** 
 (0.0452) (0.0644) (0.0637) 
married -0.0290 -0.0267 -0.0420 
 (0.0202) (0.0416) (0.0412) 
kidsnum 0.0224*** 0.0293*** 0.0289** 
 (0.00514) (0.0113) (0.0112) 
indian -0.0211 0.0606 0.0619 
 (0.0239) (0.0568) (0.0561) 
lowinc -0.0965*** -0.154*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0538) (0.0538) 
medinc -0.0463 -0.116** -0.119** 
 (0.0285) (0.0495) (0.0493) 
2012.year -0.0352 -0.221*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0622) (0.0548) 
2006.year 0.102***   
 (0.0257)   
2008.year 0.305***   
 (0.0289)   
2010.year 0.274***   
 (0.0288)   
ICT1_pca   -0.0486*** 
   (0.0162) 
Constant cut1 -1.699*** -2.069*** -1.939*** 
 (0.0557) (0.138) (0.106) 
Constant cut2 -1.304*** -1.695*** -1.565*** 
 (0.0534) (0.135) (0.102) 
Constant cut3 -0.736*** -1.154*** -1.025*** 
 (0.0521) (0.135) (0.0997) 
Constant cut4 -0.0868* -0.581*** -0.454*** 
 (0.0520) (0.135) (0.0991) 
Constant cut5 0.604*** 0.0408 0.164* 
 (0.0522) (0.135) (0.0990) 
Constant cut6 1.309*** 0.784*** 0.905*** 
 (0.0528) (0.135) (0.0998) 
    
Observations 13,565 3,420 3,420 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10. Satisfaction Toward Democracy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Int. Usage News Landline Cell Phone Computer Home Int. TV 
        
landline   -0.0291     
   (0.0219)     
female -0.0370 -0.0576** -0.0366** -0.0529*** -0.0385** -0.0654* -0.0369** 
 (0.0239) (0.0288) (0.0181) (0.0204) (0.0180) (0.0355) (0.0180) 
age 0.00386*** 0.000991 0.00365*** 0.00275*** 0.00357*** 0.00119 0.00363*** 
 (0.00106) (0.00125) (0.000794) (0.000885) (0.000786) (0.00161) (0.000785) 
educ 0.0137*** 0.00603* 0.0132*** 0.0147*** 0.0142*** 0.00858* 0.0148*** 
 (0.00316) (0.00366) (0.00234) (0.00256) (0.00235) (0.00478) (0.00229) 
remesas -0.00967 -0.119** -0.00879 -0.00944 -0.00836 -0.140** -0.00472 
 (0.0441) (0.0566) (0.0452) (0.0449) (0.0453) (0.0629) (0.0452) 
married -0.0353 -0.0468 -0.0277 -0.0288 -0.0269 -0.0513 -0.0241 
 (0.0265) (0.0322) (0.0203) (0.0228) (0.0203) (0.0405) (0.0203) 
kidsnum 0.0214*** 0.0271*** 0.0215*** 0.0273*** 0.0217*** 0.0308*** 0.0217*** 
 (0.00701) (0.00850) (0.00519) (0.00584) (0.00518) (0.0110) (0.00516) 
indian 0.0441 0.0396 -0.0244 0.0292 -0.0244 0.0791 -0.0329 
 (0.0328) (0.0420) (0.0240) (0.0270) (0.0240) (0.0553) (0.0241) 
lowinc -0.146*** -0.127*** -0.0988*** -0.106*** -0.103*** -0.144*** -0.0994*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0412) (0.0271) (0.0297) (0.0272) (0.0529) (0.0270) 
medinc -0.0806** -0.0914** -0.0429 -0.0547* -0.0438 -0.135*** -0.0411 
 (0.0323) (0.0364) (0.0285) (0.0302) (0.0285) (0.0487) (0.0285) 
2006.year   0.103***  0.0941***  0.121*** 
   (0.0257)  (0.0259)  (0.0261) 
2008.year   0.306*** 0.208*** 0.297***  0.328*** 
   (0.0290) (0.0282) (0.0292)  (0.0293) 
2010.year -0.0373  0.268*** 0.181*** 0.261***  0.299*** 
 (0.0282)  (0.0290) (0.0285) (0.0293)  (0.0292) 
2012.year -0.337*** -0.296*** -0.0407 -0.121*** -0.0451 -0.277*** -0.0121 
 (0.0314) (0.0308) (0.0318) (0.0321) (0.0319) (0.0516) (0.0320) 
internet_usage 0.00646       
 (0.0113)       
news_attn  0.0201      
  (0.0150)      
cellphone    -0.0350    
    (0.0230)    
computer_dum     -0.0560**   
     (0.0226)   
internet_home      -0.0996  
      (0.0681)  
tv       -0.123*** 
       (0.0252) 
Constant cut1 -1.902*** -1.974*** -1.692*** -1.784*** -1.702*** -2.014*** -1.752*** 
 (0.0740) (0.100) (0.0558) (0.0617) (0.0558) (0.102) (0.0567) 
Constant cut2 -1.498*** -1.583*** -1.297*** -1.398*** -1.306*** -1.642*** -1.357*** 
 (0.0710) (0.0974) (0.0535) (0.0590) (0.0535) (0.0974) (0.0543) 
Constant cut3 -0.951*** -1.028*** -0.729*** -0.834*** -0.738*** -1.097*** -0.789*** 
 (0.0695) (0.0964) (0.0522) (0.0575) (0.0522) (0.0949) (0.0530) 
Constant cut4 -0.345*** -0.413*** -0.0802 -0.191*** -0.0884* -0.528*** -0.139*** 
 (0.0692) (0.0962) (0.0522) (0.0574) (0.0521) (0.0943) (0.0529) 
Constant cut5 0.265*** 0.206** 0.611*** 0.482*** 0.602*** 0.0901 0.553*** 
 (0.0692) (0.0963) (0.0524) (0.0576) (0.0523) (0.0940) (0.0530) 
Constant cut6 0.962*** 0.853*** 1.315*** 1.186*** 1.307*** 0.836*** 1.259*** 
 (0.0695) (0.0967) (0.0530) (0.0583) (0.0529) (0.0946) (0.0536) 
        
Observations 7,843 5,338 13,519 10,676 13,531 3,494 13,558 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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